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Abstract 
 Elements of Kuhn's theory on scientific revolutions and its applicability to 
the political domain also promote explanations of military change.  In this regard, 
changes in the South African defence realm during the past decade and the rise of 
the South African National Defence Force need not be viewed as inexplicable.  
These developments represent an opportunity to explain a prominent example of 
military change in Africa through an established theory.  By making use of 
indicators drawn from the theory developed by Kuhn, an explanatory framework can 
be established to co-explain certain adjustments of the South African defence 
paradigm over the past 10 years.  Of particular relevance is Kuhn’s view of an initial 
dominant shift, which continues to evolve with the assistance of subsequent 
incremental shifts.  The South African paradigm that guided the pre-1994 Total 
Strategy defence outlook was later opposed and ousted by one that was more 
explanatory and embracing of the democratic features permeating and envisaged for 
South African society.  This democratic imperative drove the dominant shift in the 
South African defence paradigm during the middle 1990s as it dramatically and 
extensively began to adjust the policy environment regarding the role and utilisation 
of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).  In explaining his theory, 
Kuhn avers that a range of smaller adjustments towards maturing the initial shift 
soon follows the earlier dramatic shift.  Upon investigation of this secondary field of 
smaller changes, more incremental adjustments also become visible when analysing 
the South African case.  In this regard, the Defence Review (1998), the Military 
Strategy (2001), the primary-secondary role debate emanating from the 1996 
Defence White Paper, and the 2004 Defence Budget Vote represent prominent 
indicators of the ongoing maturation process.  The theory of Kuhn on scientific 
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revolutions furthermore holds that new paradigms also stand to be contested by 
rising challenges to its status.  In the case of the South African defence realm and the 
SANDF in particular, advanced regional integration and the perceived decline of the 
role of the state, could once again challenge the post-1994 defence paradigm with its 
concomitant explanation and direction of South African thought on the preparation 
and deployment of the SANDF. 
1. Introduction 
 Militaries must adjust in order to remain in step with societal changes.  
Although seldom acknowledged, military institutions are entities capable of 
changing and adjusting to changes within their operating environments.1  These 
establishments of state power, however, have to transform into the entities which 
society anticipates they should be, or risk becoming outdated and problematic 
establishments.2  Illustrative of this outlook, the Tofflers aver that as societies 
migrate through various stages, they take their military institutions along - with the 
latter having little leeway, but to adapt or become outmoded.3 
 As South African society migrated amidst shifts in its strategic environment 
to an era no longer dominated by the overlay of the Cold War and apartheid, 
emulating societal shifts in its armed forces became important.  The consequence of 
this imperative saw a move from the pre-1994 Total Onslaught approach4 to that of 
the post-1994 Defence in a Democracy approach5.  This new imperative ensured that 
South African defence thinking and the SANDF were in equilibrium with a 
changing South African society and its external strategic environment.  Kuhn's 
theory on scientific revolutions represents one way of explaining this shift in the 
South African defence realm and in particular the extent to which he extends his 
theory to dramatic political adjustments in societies.6 
 A review of the last 10 years depicts much acclaimed changes in the 
regulatory environment of the SANDF.  This observation can be ascribed to a 
number of explanations, one of which is how paradigm shifts operate and effect 
change.  Paradigm shifts do not necessarily entail an immediate and total break with 
the past, as it is argued that parting with the old and allowing for the new to achieve 
maturity involves extended time frames.  Furthermore, shedding the past in a 
dramatic and revolutionary way is possible, but the literature on paradigm shifts 
warns that this is not a common feature.  Events arising from paradigm shifts are 
also prone to reflect evolutionary progress towards desired alternatives and this 
process implies extended dynamics in order to entrench the rival paradigm, until it is 
in turn once again challenged. 
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 The following discussion is directed towards answering a simple research 
question: To what extent can the altering of the South African defence paradigm that 
debunked the realm of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) and paved 
the way for establishing the SANDF be explained by elements of the theory on 
scientific revolutions?  To answer this question, four themes are investigated.  
Scientific revolutions, as a theoretical basis for understanding paradigm shifts, are 
addressed at the outset to establish indicators for investigating the research question.  
In order to extend the latter theory to the changes which gave rise to the SANDF and 
its operating environment, three further themes will be addressed.  Firstly, the 
competitive process which gave rise to a rival defence paradigm that supplanted the 
former SADF and its defence paradigm.  Secondly, how the new paradigm became 
entrenched over time to allow for its maturation.  The third and final theme explores 
contemporary efforts to further refine the new paradigm together with a brief 
assessment of a possible future paradigm shift.  In conclusion, a number of remarks 
have been made concerning the explanatory value of paradigm shifts when applied 
to changes in the South African defence realm. 
2. Scientific Revolutions: A theory of  paradigm shifts 
 According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions arise when "an existing paradigm 
has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which 
that paradigm itself had previously led the way".7  In this regard, Kuhn draws a 
parallel between fundamental scientific shifts and that of political life in need of 
deep changes, but it being inhibited by existing institutions from taking effect.8  
From the ensuing competition arises a rival paradigm that can either augment, co-
exist with, or destroy the existing paradigm for explaining and understanding a 
certain phenomenon or practice.9 
2.1 Shifts in scientific paradigms: Some theoretical perspectives 
 For a shift to take place in a dominant view, a crisis has to ensue in so far as 
existing conceptual tools such as theories, models and concepts fail to properly solve 
rising problems in the field of understanding and explaining a phenomenon.10  Kuhn 
outlines this by emphasising that the implied change is tied up in the ascent of a rival 
paradigm which facilitates an opposing model of scientific research that flows from 
"accepted examples of actual scientific practice."11  Challenging the status quo in 
this way should be accompanied by an adjoining body of adherents comprising 
researchers, scientists, theorists and decision-makers who contest existing views and 
side with the new outlook or paradigm.  From this competition arises the paradigm 
that eventually becomes the new reigning theoretical and explanatory basis. 
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 The extent to which the rival paradigm attracts support often implies the 
demise of older schools and their supporters.  Alternatively, competing paradigms 
even co-exist for a period of time before one eventually ascends to dominance.  
Once this transpires, researchers and supporters can adhere to the new paradigm and 
concentrate upon refining it.12  This, however, is not a fait accompli as adherents to 
the status quo will defend it or introduce own adjustments to counter the challenge.  
The resultant anomaly is either addressed or it will assume crisis proportions and 
draw increasing attention in order to resolve the crisis.  If not resolved, then it is 
bound to defy new approaches and remain a problem in the field.13 
 A new paradigm is not altogether coherent and fully mature at its inception 
as it must remain open-ended so as to allow sufficient scope for new problems and 
their resolution.  It also permits accounting for a wider range of phenomena as well 
as explanations of certain past events with more precision, whilst slowly rising to 
prominence amidst attempts at refining it.  In support of the theory of Kuhn, Cohen 
argues that scientific revolutions can be small as well as large.14  Large and wide 
ranging revolutions, however, are not frequent whilst even these leaps in actual fact 
consist of small and even invisible steps.  Giant leaps are infrequent and quite visible 
above the mode of regular and incremental progress.  Nevertheless, these 
advancements do continue and gather their respective proponents and opponents.  
Dramatic shifts are regularly viewed as negative in that they sometimes promote 
threatening and dangerous progress and developments such as increasingly deadly 
weapons systems.  Such advancements are furthermore opposed from within entities 
for introducing change that opposes or destroys existing theories, beliefs and 
concepts.15  Bringing about required changes is therefore a difficult matter and 
effecting it in the military domain is no exception. 
2.2 Military change:  Shifting an entrenched paradigm 
 The contemporary and traditional paradigm of warfare is increasingly 
challenged by views that war is outdated and needs to be outlawed, adjusted, or 
radically changed.  A plethora of literature portrays the sentiment that warfare is in 
the throes of a need for change, although a broad consensus about what exactly these 
changes should involve, remains unclear.16  This pressure for change is particularly 
visible and oft debated, particularly the Western view of warfare and its 
Clausewitzian framework.17  It is furthermore also visible in the clamour for co-
operation as opposed to exclusionary and adversarial relationships based upon 
warfighting for the promotion of own interests.18 
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 The Western view of war tends to posit clarity between war and peace as 
well as upholding this clarity between soldier and civilian as war unfolds.19  This 
clinical view is increasingly challenged and alternatives are required to cope with 
new military extremities such as the terror attacks upon the USA on 11 September 
2001, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and also the spate of 
internal conflicts threatening many developing countries - particularly those of 
Africa.  This fundamental challenge demands a new perspective on the demarcation, 
accommodation and interpretation of the unfolding context of future warfare.  
However, for this to materialise requires from the proponents of warfighting futures 
to reconsider their position.  They need to also consider rival or alternative theories 
on how armed forces will operate in future and the strategic environment within 
which this is to unfold.20 
2.3 Backdrop to shifting the military-strategic paradigm 
 Arguments for and theories on a military-strategic paradigm shift unfold 
against a larger backdrop of change in terms of beliefs, theory, preconceptions, and 
prejudices on how the international system works and what shapes it.  MccGwire, 
(2001) drawing upon the work of Steinbruner (2000) and Rogers (2000), proposes 
an international system based upon co-operative engagement and consent to meet 
the challenges of a future security environment.21  MccGwire premises his argument 
upon the notion that the current and dominant paradigm of exclusionary national 
security is no longer valid and begs replacement.  He emphasises that future types of 
conflict and instability will not be sufficiently addressed by merely reconfiguring 
military forces geared for rapid deployments and long-range strikes.  A dependence 
upon these means of maintaining the status quo in the future is prone to failure.22  
Avoiding such failure may well represent a fundamental shift that entails moving 
from an adversarial national security paradigm to a co-operative global security 
paradigm.  The latter should not transpire in an abrupt and revolutionary manner, but 
rather as a learning process which is underpinned by incremental and cumulative 
shifts.23 
 For the preferred shift to take place requires some recognition of the existing 
paradigm being dysfunctional and adding to difficulties of the future by losing its 
purpose as a utility to explain and resolve challenges.  This creates some conceptual 
space for new thought to enter.  However, four prerequisites are judged to underpin 
a shift of this nature.  In a similar vein to the ideas of Kuhn, MccGwire notes these 
as follows.  First, an impulse for change from shared fears and a common alternative 
vision to for example peace through warfighting.  Secondly, the absence or removal 
of obstacles which obstruct migration towards a new paradigm, such as the influence 
of bellicose actors.  Third, an engine of change that can for example be a treaty, or 
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the establishment of a regional body, to direct matters at hand.  Lastly, a 
precipitating cause or event as illustrated by the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union.24  Effecting a shift therefore requires some range of events or developments 
to allow for a dramatic new outlook to enter.  This invariably promotes the idea that 
changing a reigning practice is bound to be a problematic process – particularly in 
the case of changing attitudes and preferences encased in historic entrenchments.25 
2.4 Military change and the danger of military stasis 
 The saying "if you don't know where you're going, then any road will do"26 
could well apply to the future complexity faced by some defence forces.  Warfare is 
a social phenomenon that is constantly subject to influences or pressures for 
change.27  This pressure is intensified by the dynamics of unclear or unpredictable 
stages of development and change along which societies tend to progress.  Such 
uncertainty creates much difficulty for defence decision-makers responsible for 
guiding their armed forces towards the future.  Illustrative of this is the irregular 
progression of defence forces alongside their societies from the agricultural era 
through industrialisation to a post-industrial and the current information era.28  In a 
similar trend, one can trace how defence forces were adapted to keep in line with 
civilisational shifts as societies progressed from city states (Classical Civilisation) to 
feudal states (Medieval Civilisation) to nation states (Modern Civilisation).29 
 Progressive stages and social development, 20th century understandings and 
a focus on technologies and economic foundations for their production tended to 
underpin outlooks on military change for some time.30  The extent to which coping 
with such change defies the competencies of decision-makers allows for the rise of 
military stasis.  Military stasis is further fuelled by whether or not the existing 
paradigm of war is accepted, adjusted or even radically altered.31  Dealing with 
future difficulties requires of defence and military decision-makers to also contend 
with current demands and changes within the framework of so-called legacy systems 
and a now outdated was of understanding and preparing for war.32  This dilemma 
holds the risk of entrenched military stasis whereby existing strategy, concepts, and 
tactics are merely continued, irrespective of changing futures.  This intransigence is 
perpetuated by an assumed military unwillingness to allow for important structural 
and cultural changes.33 
 A major strategic adjustment or shift as stated by Bauman and the 
opportunities alluded to by MccGwire transpired in the international arena during 
the late 20th century.  The demise of the former Soviet Union confronted many 
armed forces with dramatic changes to the structure of the international strategic 
environment and the need for a particularly type of military force.  The defence 
parameters that steered military thinking since the end of the Second World War 
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soon became open to question.34  This shift in the strategic context which previously 
underpinned much of the rationale on preparing military forces and viewing future 
war in a somewhat predictable fashion called for politico-military decision-makers 
and theorists to reinterpret future warfare and align their military forces 
accordingly.35 
 As armed forces around the globe increasingly find themselves exposed to 
continuous change, fewer resources and diminishing public sympathy, the risk of 
them not being able to adjust to the demands of their external and domestic 
environments has increased.  These demands constitute a need for change and for 
responsible decision-makers to embark upon revolutionary or evolutionary 
adjustments of reigning military paradigms.  These alternatives also faced the South 
African defence sphere during the late 20th and early 21st centuries.  The military 
complex was confronted by an array of challenges that initiated dramatic change to 
the defence paradigm regarding the use of the armed forces in the future. 
3. Shifting the defence paradigm: From total strategy to defence in a 
democracy 
 Military forces need to adjust if they are to remain a reflection of and 
relevant to the societies from which they originate and ultimately have to defend.  
During the past decade this appeal assumed an increasing international and national 
setting.  Adhering to the latter appeal, the societal reflection and relevance of the 
SANDF received close political attention.36  Less well known perhaps, is that its 
opposite, military stasis, with its own range of problems for society also became 
intensely debated in the South African Parliament on 22 June 1995.  This debate 
involved a determined presentation by the then Deputy Minister of Defence on 
taking the defence force into the future as opposed to the risk of allowing it to 
become redundant and for military stasis to enter by allowing the defence status quo 
to continue.37 
 During its early transition, the SANDF grappled with its future pathways.  
This uncertainty led to a statement in 1995 by Deputy Defence Minister Kasrils 
"[that]  our future depends on us and the way we prepare for that future".  One 
driving force of this perceived future was to break with the pre-1994 defence 
paradigm through new defence thinking.  Mapping out the run up to and response to 
this call for a new defence paradigm can be compiled from the theory underpinning 
paradigm shifts.  The comparison presented below draws upon nine indicators from 
the theory on scientific revolutions to illustrate shifts in the South African defence 
realm since the first half of the 1990s. 
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3.1 An emerging crisis for the defence realm 
 Changes in the international strategic environment from 1989 assumed a 
rapid and deeply influential impact upon the international system of states and their 
relations.  South Africa chose to remain in step with the emergent international 
system and this not only posed a dilemma to its political decision-makers, but to its 
array of military and defences cadres as well.38  Amidst the external changes, the 
impact of the 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions accentuated the 
predicament of those in the South African defence realm.39  These constitutional 
stipulations effectively began to block or terminate the exclusivity and influence of 
the incumbent military establishment by setting stringent normative confines upon 
its future operations.  As a result, the reigning outlook which governed defence 
thinking and the use of South African armed forces came into question and 
consequently became quite incompatible with these normative arrangements.  In 
addition, the 1975 and 1977 Defence White Papers that had introduced and 
solidified the Total Strategy for a Total Onslaught mould quickly lost their 
credibility and validity to address new military matters arising from a changed 
strategic and constitutional environment.  Consequently, preferences for conducting 
defence as contained in the ANC blueprint Ready to Govern40 emerged to fill the 
mounting void as these perspectives were judged to be more in line with future 
defence requirements.41  However, it should be acknowledged that, in spite of the 
availability of the Ready to Govern manifesto, those opposing the status quo did not 
have an altogether coherent alternative programme or blueprint on defence matters 
to immediately replace that of the previous dispensation.42 
 The prospect of an outdated defence position and the presence of an 
immature alternative represented fertile ground for a crisis in the South African 
defence realm directing the use of its armed forces.  Creating legitimate security 
institutions and a new approach to defence had little common ground with the 
incumbent defence approach of the pre-1994 government and its conduct of military 
affairs.  This latter mode of defence thinking was fast becoming outdated, but no 
immediate and coherent alternative was in place.  This inconsistency can be viewed 
as a lingering or ensuing crisis that allowed conceptual space to question its validity 
and argue for its replacement. 
3.2 The ascent of a rival paradigm 
 The ascent of a rival defence paradigm emanated from three coincidental 
circumstances.  First, the potential stasis that entered from the lack of explanatory 
utility by existing defence thought of the early 1990s.  Secondly, the emergence of a 
group of theorists and proponents seeking to introduce a new perspective upon what 
direction South African defence thinking should assume.43  Thirdly, the subsequent 
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crisis that emerged as discussed in the above section.  The combination of the void, 
potential stasis and the rise of a group which promoted a competing view upon the 
future role of South African armed forces facilitated the ascent of a rival paradigm to 
replace the existing one and its bias towards competitive national security through 
military security. 
 The rival paradigm had its foundations in a new security approach which 
was more inclusive and explanatory of the needs and imperatives that began to 
characterise the environment of armed forces.  It not only originated from the ideas 
of MccGwire and Buzan as alluded to in the above section, but, according to its 
proponents, defence and democracy had to be closely aligned to serve the needs and 
security of South African society.  This approach materialised from the growing 
focus on human security as opposed to state security and was promoted through the 
exposure of its South African proponents to British-Scandinavian defence 
thinking.44  Subsequently, defence in a democracy and similar terminology began to 
define the contours of the emerging South African defence paradigm.  At its heart 
featured the destruction of the politicised, racial and militaristic features of its 
predecessor and replacing it with a constitutionally embedded and democratically 
based legitimacy cloak.45 
3.3 An adjoining body of adherents comprising researchers, scientists, 
theorists and decision-makers 
 A constituency of adherents arose between 1989 and 1994 who were 
committed to a defence outlook more suitable to the democratic futures to be served 
by the South African defence community.  As the realisation dawned that the use of 
a utility which was embedded in military security was questionable, the need for an 
alternative drew increasing attention.  From this group, later known as the Military 
Research Group (MRG), emerged views on the logic and utility of an alternative 
paradigm to fill the existing void by replacing or dramatically augmenting the 
reigning military paradigm.  During the early 1990s, the SADF paradigm reflected a 
posture embedded in state or regime security cast into a pre-emptive, operationally 
offensive strategic posture.46  It was this very mode of security and its brand of 
defence thinking that became opposed by a body of adherents that sought to support 
the introduction of a rival paradigm.  According to Kenkel, the MRG also embodied 
a small group of academics who eventually rose to form an influential entity which 
was to introduce an alternative defence paradigm and convince defence decision-
makers of its viability.47 
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 The MRG managed to introduce a coherent and viable alternative theory for 
future defence thought and convince influential defence decision-makers of its 
credibility and validity, and as a consequence, an adjoining body of adherents 
emerged.  This body not only comprised academics, but attracted senior members of 
the ANC and its military wing.  They became closely associated with and accepted 
by the new policy-makers in the emergent South African defence realm.48  This 
coalition further strengthened the prerequisite of a diverse body of adherents 
required to sustain the introduction and functioning of a rival paradigm.  They 
constituted the energy behind the rival defence paradigm and furthermore embodied 
a crucial body of adherents to oppose those potentially supporting the status quo. 
3.4  The existing paradigm becomes dysfunctional and adds to future 
difficulties 
 Given the extent to which the pre-1994 paradigm rested upon a notion of 
security as primarily a military and police problem, it was rather irreconcilable with 
the new view of security in so far as it concerns the security of people.49  Inherently 
the competitive national security based defence outlook clashed with that of the rival 
paradigm moulded by 'Defence in a Democracy' and its regional vision.  Whilst the 
pre-1994 outlook showed a strong inclination to meet threats head-on and beyond 
national borders (within the sub-region)50 the opposing outlook assumed a softer 
approach by not militarising all threats and thus not linking the bulk of its solution to 
the use of armed coercion.  As this realisation dawned, militarisation through Total 
Strategy became further eroded as a limited or marginal paradigm to explain and/or 
present solutions to future security threats in the Southern African region.  In this 
regard an interesting view is that many senior SADF officers most probably already 
realised by 1989 that a paradigmatic shift in defence was imminent.  Amongst other 
factors, the rescinding of the ban on the ANC and other movements gave rise to a 
process which would chip away at the latticework that kept Total Strategy intact51 
and it was bound to become dysfunctional.  Inherent to this process, Kotze avers that 
some senior SADF officers also played a positive role in facilitating a non-disruptive 
transition from the old SANDF mindset to that of the incoming cadres and their 
preferences.52 
 The rise of an alternative framework (although incomplete at the time) for 
conducting defence matters further contributed to the dysfunctionality and demise of 
Total Onslaught/Total Strategy.  The resultant switch between pre- and post-1994 
defence thought and its guidance for using armed forces could well be characterised 
as a paradigm shift where the dysfunctional South African defence paradigm or 
mould was replaced by a rival paradigm.53  This image promotes the idea of an 
initial major shift in the realm of defence.  Theoretical arguments and preferences in 
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the military realm, as argued by Huntington in Two Worlds of Military Policy (1974) 
and Kuhn, are, however, not always precisely reflected in the world of practical 
military decision-making.  This warning needs to be heeded and is elaborated upon 
in the section below. 
3.5  A paradigm shift is rarely a quick and uncomplicated phenomenon 
 In understanding the process of a paradigm shift, one also has to observe the 
warning by Kuhn that such a shift is a competitive process with the dysfunctional 
paradigm and its adherents not merely bowing out to the competition.54  Although 
the transformation of the SADF to that of the SANDF could well be presented as 
illustrative of a major and fundamental shift in the South African defence domain, 
two perspectives influence the perceived immediate optimism.  First, a political need 
to convince a changing South African society that the ousting of the SADF has been 
effected through changes of paradigmatic proportions and secondly, the imperative 
to convince society competing with the scientific reality that paradigm shifts are 
rarely sudden and once-off events.  These two qualifications colour the optimism of 
effecting revolutionary changes during the initial changes as Kuhn warns that some 
competition is bound to persist. 
 In the case of the SANDF and its policy environment, certain traits as 
described by Kuhn on how a paradigm shift tends to materialise over time also need 
to be noted.  First, a paradigm is not always fully matured from its inception and this 
is found in the South African case.  Secondly, its opposition does not suddenly fade 
into oblivion.  Third, it takes time for a new paradigm and its adherents to overcome 
lingering facets of the earlier paradigm whilst it also has to contend with difficulties 
upon its path towards maturation. 
 Kenkel avers that the emergence of a strand of defence thought that was 
judged to coincide with the views of defence in a democracy also had to contend 
with obstacles.  As noted earlier, adherents of the rising paradigm initially had no 
coherent and finalised defence alternative to introduce into the hovering defence 
void of the early and middle 1990s.55  Subsequently, only a normative framework of 
the new paradigm was introduced.  The unfinished business of this initial normative 
shift becomes visible in the provision of the 1996 Defence White Paper for a later 
Defence Review to solidify the initial shifts effected.56  Matters reserved for the 
Defence Review were long-range planning issues on matters such as posture, 
doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human 
resources and funding.57  This dual process indicates the lingering need to later 
solidify and establish the new paradigm more securely whilst also accentuating the 
reality of the initial, but dramatic shift, not being an immediate cure-all. 
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3.5.1  The opposition does not fade into oblivion 
 From its inception, the rival paradigm on defence introduced around 1994 
had to contend with elements of its predecessor.  However, by drawing the finer 
contours of what this opposition entailed, it emerges that deliberate opposition by 
members of the former defence establishment is difficult to isolate.  In more abstract 
terms, one manifestation is the criticism of maintaining the primary role of defence 
against aggression through conventional warfighting within the set roles of the 
SANDF.  This criticism holds that maintaining this priority reflects a vestige of 
earlier thought which was a feature of the ousted paradigm.58  A second abstraction 
is that many of those serving in the SADF remained in service for an extended 
period of time and some still do.  By 1998 white officers still constituted almost 
70% of the officer corps whilst white Non-Commissioned Officers formed more 
than 40% of the NCO-rankings.  Even after initial integration it was projected that 
former SADF members might probably still constitute more than 30% of the 
SANDF.59  Although difficult to state in empirical terms, due to the extent to which 
former SADF members occupy middle and senior positions, elements of the 
previous paradigm continue and, rightly or wrongly, stand to be tagged as lingering 
elements of the ousted paradigm.60 
 During the period immediately preceding the 1996 Defence White Paper, 
proponents of the new paradigm also had to contend with direct inputs of senior 
SADF members.  These inputs reflected a military technocratic outlook that 
sometimes clashed with the preferred extended defence outlook for establishing a 
new defence paradigm.61  The preference contained in the latter, however, was 
seemingly one of moving as far away as possible from the pre-1994 defence 
paradigm and all it stood for.  This determination led those opposing the existing 
paradigm towards the fields of critical security studies, human security and the 
pursuit of peace, rather than managing war, in order to refine the opposing 
paradigm.62  Certain SADF officials, however, tried to confine matters to narrow 
military issues, thus competing with the alternative and more normative defence 
outlook entered by those supporting an opposing paradigm.63  Subsequently, both 
during its initial inception, as well as during later stages, indicators of potential 
competition to influence the new paradigm can be identified.  This flowed forth as 
military practitioners of the previous dispensation and proponents of the new 
competed to have their ideas recognised amidst a climate of upholding consensual 
defence decision-making.64  Finally, and in lieu of the above arguments being 
somewhat ambiguous, one could argue that opposition by former SADF officers 
emanated from differences pertaining to how to migrate to the new paradigm and 
manage this potentially explosive period rather than to the new paradigm itself.65  
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More substantial research is perhaps required to prove or disprove deliberate 
opposition to the selected defence paradigm. 
3.5.2 A new paradigm allows for explaining a wider range of phenomena 
 The extent to which a new paradigm achieves acceptance also results from 
its use as a tool to address a wider range of phenomena in its field.66  According to 
Nathan, the new South African defence paradigm was dramatically different from its 
predecessor, but quite in line with established broader defence thinking of the time.67  
Accordingly, as the rising paradigm more closely reflected the debates in scholarly 
literature and defence policy in established democracies, it was bound to be more 
explanatory and open-ended than its predecessor.  Furthermore, it also became 
suited to the democratic imperative deliberately injected into the South African 
defence debate and societal changes at that time, which became inevitable features 
of the South African strategic landscape.  This closer interface obviously appealed to 
the democratic line preferred by political decision-makers and entrenched in the 
South African Constitution.  Therefore, by cloaking the regulating policy 
environment and roles of the defence force in a democratic cloak, it eased political 
apprehensions. 
 As opposed to the more military styled outlook of the pre-1994 era, the post-
1994 defence outlook and its directing paradigm constituted a framework to address 
and explain much more than mere military matters.  The preferred new paradigm 
and its underpinnings of an extended view of security, allowed for a more coherent 
coverage of defence related matters.  As opposed to the pre-1994 White Papers that 
primarily addressed military defence and related industries, the post-1994 version 
extended its ambit to include eight topics which encompassed transformation, civil-
military relations, the strategic environment, roles and functions, human resources, 
budgetary considerations, arms control and the defence industry, land and 
environmental issues.68 
 In addition to more traditional matters of defence, the rival defence 
paradigm also included domains above and below the state.  Inter-departmental and 
sub-regional defence co-operation and its extension to regional and international 
levels became focal points of the extended paradigm that set it further apart from its 
predecessor.  Inter-departmental co-operation for example, had a specific focus upon 
socio-economic upliftment.69  Sub-regional defence co-operation had both defence 
as well as socio-economic goals whilst the regional and international aspirations (in 
line with international trends) reflected notions to address conflict in a preventative 
and co-operative way, rather than meeting it with interventionist and coercive 
means.  In contrast to the prior paradigm and its coercive focus, the post 1994-
paradigm and its entrenchment in human security, democratic principles and non-
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isolation allowed for a more extended defence domain to be explained and entered.  
The emergent South African defence paradigm therefore not only addressed 
domestic matters, but also linked South African defence policy to international shifts 
of a military and non-military kind and so became more explanatory and 
accommodating than its predecessor.70 
3.6 Difficulties upon the pathway of maturation 
 The normative function of a new paradigm is to provide both a map as well 
as direction to the future as is acknowledged by Kuhn.71   In the South African case 
the acceptance of a normative framework of defence was linked to the notion of 
Defence in a Democracy.  This notion, in turn, became institutionalised via the 
Defence White Paper that set in place a framework for considering the future 
direction of defence matters and to map out the role of the SANDF.  From these 
foundations, the ongoing maturation of the rival paradigm had to be secured.  During 
this maturation process smaller and more evolutionary shifts and adjustments as 
ascribed to Kuhn's theory by Cohen, transpired to fill the voids effected by the initial 
major competition and jostling between the supporters of the opposing paradigms.72  
This maturation is addressed more comprehensively in the following section. 
4.  Promoting the maturation of an emerging paradigm shift 
 The theory on paradigm shifts posits that although open ended in kind, a 
new paradigm does not enter with a maturity that immediately supersedes all aspects 
of its predecessor.  It requires time to establish itself and become the dominant 
driver and explanatory standard for resultant changes and events.  Given that 
indicators of the rise of a rival paradigm were illustrated in the preceding section, it 
is subsequently also essential to trace indicators of the maturation process of this 
process. 
 Pertaining to the SANDF in particular, it is possible to identify and discuss 
four key indicators that functioned as mediating factors for the preferred new 
defence paradigm to find a more secure footing.  These indicators can be labelled as: 
the discourse on the primary role of the SANDF, efforts to reinforce policy with an 
appropriate military strategy and the process to move the SANDF towards new roles 
and in particular that of a regional role player amidst the call for a defence review 
towards the end of 2004. 
4.1  Debating the primary role of the SANDF 
 The post-1994 roles of the SANDF became established within the triad of 
strategic objectives providing defence against aggression, promoting security, and 
supporting the people of South Africa.73  These objectives were developed, refined, 
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and captured in the SANDF Military Strategy.  At the pinnacle of this triad, defence 
against aggression remained the primary focus.  From its inception, this focus did 
not enjoy universal acceptance as it was thought to reflect previous cultural and 
ideological preferences.74  Such criticism reflects that the decision to afford the 
primary role such centrality was not accepted by all parties - including certain 
adherents of the new paradigm.  This lack of consensus and siding with past 
preferences inevitably raised the need to reconsider the primacy of this role at some 
future point in time.75  Perpetuating older thought and preferences as an obstacle to 
the new paradigm was also criticised by Vale and pointed out as a lost opportunity 
and lack of imagination for introducing dramatic change to the defence debate.76  
Vale contends that the new incumbents merely continued the security perceptions of 
their predecessors and remained influenced by and even perpetuated significant 
elements of the "ousted" paradigm.77 
 A second view on the need to review the primacy of the primary role 
became visible in the Defence Budget Speech of 2004 when the Defence Minister, 
Mosiuoa Lekota, acknowledged that the outlook of 1994 did not accurately foresee 
the prominence of one of the secondary roles envisaged for the SANDF, namely 
promoting peace in Africa.78  Certain matters need to be revisited and he pointed out 
the salience of promoting peace in Africa.  Although not indicative of revoking the 
primary role, it is possible to argue that peacekeeping, as a secondary role of the 
SANDF, is to assume a much more prominent and even primary profile in the near 
future.  This lingering stand-off is essentially also part of the maturation of the new 
defence paradigm and its slant towards promoting peace and security, rather than 
warfighting.  No true solution for this reality is apparent and, according to Kuhn's 
theory, one could aver that it is to "remain a problem in the field."79 
4.2  Reinforcing policy with an appropriate strategy 
 Although the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review 
(1998) represent much groundwork for forging a new paradigm, a supporting 
military strategy for the SANDF only came into effect by 2001.  The military 
strategy had to relate new policy realms to roles and missions for the SANDF and 
adjust them amidst the drastic changes it represented.80  The identified spectrum of 
missions for the 2001 Military Strategy is characterised by extremities in the sense 
that all three ends, (defence against aggression, promoting security and supporting 
the people of South Africa), feature alongside one another.81  The strategy clarifies 
how the roles of the SANDF (as defined in the Defence White Paper) are to be 
executed and continuously prioritises them as to the perceived strategic 
environment.  It furthermore also provides a window on a preceding time frame of 
six years and repeated efforts to interface the crucial policy-strategy continuum by 
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accommodating or acknowledging deep policy changes.82  By completing this 
relationship, the Military Strategy of 2001 refines and further entrenches the initial 
indicators of a paradigm shift. 
 The SANDF Military Strategy also serves to address the normative 
broadness and even vagueness of the policy environment.  Although the void of 
policies being vague and broad was acknowledged during the 2004 Defence Budget 
Vote, the introduction of the triad of strategic ends, ways and means closed much of 
the conceptual gap that plagued the execution of the newly introduced policy.  
Despite it only coming to fruition five years down the line (1996-2001), the military 
strategic capabilities, military strategic concepts, and military strategic objectives 
were nonetheless introduced to serve the needs of policy.83  Subsequently, the 2001 
strategy closed down the initial distance between the rise of a new, but immature 
defence paradigm, the resultant policy for its introduction and a strategy for 
execution.  This strategy-policy link kept the SANDF in step with the requirements 
and expectations of its higher-order policy framework, its democratic imperative, 
and contributed to a more mature defence paradigm. 
4.3  Assuming new roles to satisfy new policy outlooks 
 The introduction of a new defence paradigm raised a further difficult matter 
for the SANDF.  It had to adjust some elements of its posture, strategic culture and 
also its roles in order to remain in equilibrium with new roles envisaged by policy-
makers.  This called for an extended outlook upon the diverse defence requirements 
that ultimately have to be executed by the SANDF.  Le Roux84 addressed this 
dilemma by pointing out that the SANDF needs to be structured and prepared in a 
way that provides for executing an ever-increasing spectrum of roles, but 
emphasised the fact that it cannot be designed for each of these roles.  The need, 
therefore, is for the SANDF to be able to execute its most enduring role and, from 
this inherent capacity, also deal with the plethora of other roles ascribed to the 
SANDF since the 1994 transition.  Inherently, the architects of the SANDF military 
strategy addressed this need.  By reconciling the primary-secondary preferences and 
demands through regular prioritisation of roles and missions for the SANDF, they 
found a way to infuse order to the profusion of normative demands placed upon the 
SANDF.85 
 Finding a pathway to introduce new defence thinking which promoted 
democratic principles and appropriate roles was also the topic of an address by the 
Chief of the SANDF, General Siphiwe Nyanda, during 2000 at the Annual General 
Meeting of the South African Institute of International Affairs.  By acknowledging 
that the total strategy and its threat-based approach had been superseded, Nyanda 
remarked that new defence thinking could not readily indulge in images of solving 
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conflicts by military means.  The difficulty of this matter finds expression in how to 
maintain a traditional military readiness as well as those capabilities that promote 
legitimacy of the SANDF in the eyes of South African society.86  As a new defence 
outlook took effect, it did not automatically have the SANDF and its roles migrate in 
some synchronised fashion.  Some disequilibrium thus remained between the 
preferred outlook and reality of using the SANDF to play its role.  Hence, the call by 
Nyanda during 2000 for "much deeper thought and academic debate" to deal with 
new defence thinking.  As for the emergent paradigm, this call points towards initial 
shifts that still had to be fleshed out in subsequent debates to establish proper 
pathways towards the future use of the SANDF. 
 The contours of using the SANDF as a policy instrument became more lucid 
in an article by Du Plessis87 in which he defines priorities introduced by the military 
strategy on the missions of the SANDF, the use of its inherent capacity to perform a 
spectrum of roles, and that the resolution of conflict is not only vested in military 
means.  Although the article upholds the traditional nexus of the military instrument 
as a foreign policy option, it also alludes to its adjustment to serve a changed 
defence outlook and in particular the regionalisation of South African foreign 
interests.88  In essence, the recent (post-1994) use of the military instrument by 
South Africa assumed a profile that reflects diversity and the near absence of its use 
up to 1998.  Its initial absence, but especially its recent saliency could, however, also 
be interpreted as incremental steps to systematically, if not cautiously, assume new 
roles to satisfy emergent policy outlooks.89  In order to maintain consistency, fitting 
the use of the SANDF to the emergent defence paradigm tends to portray a gradual 
curve stretching from its non-use towards its restrained use and, as can be assumed 
from the 2004 Defence Budget Vote, eventually an indelible footprint beyond the 
national borders.  In retrospect, this cautious use, as argued by Du Plessis, is also 
indicative of testing or experimenting over time and the maturation of the upcoming 
defence paradigm. 
4.4  A 2004 review of defence matters 
 During the 2004 Defence Budget Vote explicit reference was made to a 
second defence review or at the minimum - a review of both the Defence White 
Paper of 1996 and Defence Review of 1998 by the end of 2004.  The Minister stated 
that "[w]e aim to complete the review of the White Paper on Defence and the 
Defence Review by the end of this year.  This is a crucial exercise and will drive the 
last phase of the transformation of the Department of Defence."90  This statement 
points towards some lingering disequilibrium between what the initial Defence 
White Paper and Defence Review set out to promote and achieve, and the extent to 
which it materialised during the intervening years.  In particular, the escalation of 
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SANDF involvement in an array of peace missions and the demands it placed upon 
the SANDF, were apparently incorrectly judged and inadequately provided for.91 
 Verbal and written commitments to a regional role for the SANDF and the 
practicalities of assuming such a role amidst that of maintaining the primary role of 
defence against aggression, most probably need a finer balance or reprioritisation as 
originally perceived and opposed by Williams.92  Williams maintains an extremely 
critical stance on the continued primacy of the primary role over that of the 
secondary domain.  However, as acknowledged by the Minister of Defence, 
maintaining the paradigm introduced with the advent of the 1996 White Paper to 
shift defence thinking away from the warfighting role to that of preventing war and 
promoting peace, did not foresee the longer term.93  This acknowledgement and the 
proposed measures to address the perceived caveats and shortcomings also indicate 
later or ongoing incremental adjustments to ideas of a newly introduced defence 
paradigm.  The implied adjustments are directed at the following entities and 
functions:94 
- Enhancing the capacity of the Defence Secretariat to better compliment the 
SANDF.95 
- Refining defence procurement to prevent overlap between procurement and 
the manufacturing sector. 
- Refining South Africa's role and contribution in peacekeeping by also 
drawing upon the cumulative experiences gained during the recent past and 
to enter the realm of sustainable peacekeeping. 
- Reviewing the responsibilities placed upon South African defence 
architecture by the African Union (AU) and its sub-structures. 
- Tackling the difficult dilemma of intervention when human life is threatened 
and the matters obstructing this responsibility. 
- The need to solidify and assist a newly introduced paradigm to full 
maturation is proposed by the theory on paradigm shifts.  This process can 
also be identified in the South African case as the passage of time and 
various events tested elements of the new defence paradigm and affirmed, 
rather than dislodged, it.  However, as Kuhn argues that maturity is 
characterised by repetitive shifts,96 a further challenge is the possibility of a 
subsequent paradigm shift.  This is very briefly explored in the following 
section. 
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5. Moving towards the future: From here to where? 
 Post-1994 South African defence policy and the armed forces, in the view of 
one of its the primary architects, has undergone a fundamental transformation and 
even a paradigm shift in relation to the apartheid era defence policy and its 
implementation strategy.97  This fundamental shift, according to Nathan (2004), was 
followed by a period of consolidation and the entrenchment of wide-ranging changes 
introduced to the South African defence domain. 
 It is, however, the responsibility of policy-makers to scan the future and 
think ahead.  Societies continue to progress and for defence institutions to remain 
relevant to what society expects of them, they have to keep in step.  In the case of 
the SANDF, as the primary instrument of defence policy, the euphoria of the 1994 
transition that included major shifts in its defence and military sectors, should not be 
viewed as a future cure-all.  Forward-looking decision-makers, analysts, and 
theorists need to consider evolutionary and even revolutionary adjustments to the 
defence paradigm now generally known as Defence in a Democracy. 
5.1  An evolutionary adjustment to the defence paradigm: Interfacing with 
the African co-operative security paradigm 
 The notion of multilaterism (the practice of co-ordinating national policies in 
groups of three or more states) is a prominent aspiration amongst states of the 
current international order.98  In this regard, the African co-operative agenda flows 
along political imperatives towards an eventual outcome of higher-end regional 
integration and achieving a security community at some future point in time.  
Embracing this preference, South Africa opted (and recently even more so) to 
channel much of its defence efforts towards this African realm.  South Africa now 
closely associates itself with the ideals of the AU and that of promoting peace and 
security in a multilateral and co-operative way as, for instance, argued by 
MccGwire.  This declared migration process towards different levels of integration 
implies that defence institutions have to co-migrate in support of it.  The nexus 
between political and defence migration to sustain political and economic 
integration is acknowledged in the African sphere and the defence connection is 
seen to be promoted and eventually executed through the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) and a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP).99 
 The acknowledgement that national defence matters need a review in order 
to align them with extended African involvement and ideals of the AU, is not only 
indicative of South Africa's commitment.  This statement also points towards 
continuous defence adjustments to realign the military policy instrument more 
appropriately.100  Of particular relevance are references in the Minister of Defence's 
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speech on the 2004/2005 Defence Budget Vote to Africa and that a defence force 
engaged in peacekeeping operations operates entirely differently from a defence 
force at war.  His deliberate emphasis on integrating the defence function and its 
domain with sub-regional and regional structures should not be ignored.  It reveals a 
clear intent regarding the focus of the upcoming defence review and of aligning 
defence and, particularly the SANDF, with national priorities towards the African 
region. 
 During the State of the Nation Address of 21 May 2004 by the South African 
President, Thabo Mbeki, the African agenda also received prominence with a special 
emphasis on the PSC of the AU.  If read together with the 2004 Defence Budget 
Vote, this coincidental emphasis on establishing African security mechanisms serves 
as an indicator of its saliency - considering that the State of the Nation Address 
otherwise overwhelmingly focussed upon domestic socio-economic matters.  From a 
defence point of view, the relevance of this is contained in the statement that "South 
Africans must change their isolationist mindset and support the creation of stability 
in the region".101  In this regard, both the President, and the Minister of Defence, 
clearly indicated the importance of taking defence to the African realm from 2004 
onwards.  This is bound to constitute a primary field of defence activity in the near 
future.  Although it is possible to extensively speculate about what these activities 
could entail, it is more functional to limit the discussion to particular indicators of 
what is envisaged. 
 Although the 1963 establishment of the OAU included a proposal to search 
for continental frameworks to promote peace and security on the African continent, 
2004 is perhaps the year where the most progress was forthcoming.  Having been 
introduced during the 2002 establishment of the AU, the PSC was formally 
constituted during May 2004.  South African political commitment and support to 
the PSC makes it a future domain to which South African defence thinking now has 
to be adjusted.  This adjustment is bound to terminate the recent somewhat ad hoc 
defence involvement in the region in favour of a formally structured responsibility.  
The latter is to have the SANDF tailored towards an array of missions on the African 
continent, but within the ambit of the PSC and its main military structure, the 
African Standby Force (ASF).102 
 Establishing multidisciplinary standby contingents with civilian and military 
components located within the country and fully ready for rapid deployment to 
perform the following functions by 2010: 
− Observation and monitoring 
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- Peace support missions, intervention in member states on request of the 
member state, or when grave circumstances require 
- Preventative deployment 
- Peace building and post-conflict involvement 
- Humanitarian assistance 
 The costs, logistics, personnel and finances involved in establishing a 
dependable ASF are also bound to place several demands upon the South African 
defence community and the SANDF in particular given the scope of African 
conflicts to be addressed.  This responsibility requires a capacity to contend with the 
following: 
- Extensive budgetary contributions to the AU Peace Fund amidst the lack of 
assurances that both member states as well as other partners are to sustain 
their contributions.103 
- Troop and observer contributions to the ASF in the face of an ever-
expanding range of conflicts on the African continent.104 
- Partaking in establishing a regional brigade and sustaining such a brigade to 
be operational through subsequent involvement in self-sustainability for 30 
days, logistical infrastructure, and on-call donor-owned equipment.105 
 Although current South African defence policy alludes to the African agenda 
to promote security, recent national policy statements have placed high on the list of 
policy imperatives to which South African defence policy and the SANDF must 
adapt.  Executing this policy-imperative is now bound to draw increased attention, 
resources, and time commitments in order to establish it as policy outputs and 
strategic priorities.  This declared intent is to challenge the current South African 
defence paradigm to rise to the challenge and serve to align policy, strategy and its 
primary instrument, the SANDF, more closely to this envisaged realm of co-
operative African military futures for 2010 and beyond. 
5.2 A possible revolutionary adjustment to the defence paradigm:  Highly 
integrated and stateless defence futures 
 The previous discussion still alludes to possible incremental adjustments to a 
defence paradigm that assumed ascendancy and portrays ongoing adjustments to 
entrench its normative outlooks or explanations of the South African defence realm.  
This also depicts ongoing small revolutions as projected by Kuhn to drive the 
normal curve of progress in a field.106  Moving further forward entails stepping into 
the future and the realm of a successive paradigm.  In this mode, future South 
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African defence outlooks could either be posited along a linear extension of the 
status quo, or be viewed in a non-linear way where the status quo once again 
crumbles and its defence paradigm becomes challenged. 
 Firstly, a more linear outlook towards longer term futures is bound to follow 
the alternative of a defence realm where defence matters become so integrated for 
the sake of interoperability that it flows across national borders in the pursuit of 
security.  This integration far exceeds the co-operative notion alluded to in the 
previous section.  Secondly, the non-linear alternative fundamentally questions the 
presence of defence amidst the state and its interests withering away and leaving 
defence forces devoid of their primary and even their secondary roles. 
 Moving towards a future of highly integrated military forces is perhaps not 
as far-fetched as images of this were alluded to during the 2003 South African 
Defence Budget vote.107  In this regard, Gagiano108 furthermore avers that 
establishing military capabilities along collective security and towards future 
interoperable and interdependent lines might well require a different security 
paradigm for he distinguishes between a paradigm to foster warfighting capabilities, 
and one for collective security. The latter calls for defence forces to operate in a 
combined manner, with reciprocal trust and confidence along lines promoting 
interoperability of equipment, human resources and doctrine.  This requires quality 
decisions in the present to establish parameters for future defence and later 
adjustments to unfolding futures.109  In this regard, extended time frames are 
projected for the integration of defence forces towards advanced interoperability 
between African defence forces as a future-operating domain of the SANDF. 
 The extended outlook by Gagiano calls for establishing tenets and a 
framework in order to have interoperable African defence forces at some future 
point in time to eradicate most forms of warfare.  Considering the AU's current 
determination with erasing the scourge of war, the image being promoted is one of a 
warless future that in itself challenges current defence outlooks and its preference 
for some form of warfighting or role for defence forces.  This represents a greatly 
altered, but not isolated paradigm for armed forces.  According to Moskos, armed 
forces have to be adjusted to function even within futures not calling for traditional 
military roles and even within warless futures.110  The migration towards desired 
futures devoid of war supposes a certain politico-military migration that unfolds 
progressively, but in a synchronised manner to lower enmity and accentuate amity.  
An image of this politico-military co-migration and foreseen outcome is illustrated 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  A Possible Pathway towards Political and Military Integration. 
Probability of 
war 
Pathway for political 
integration 
(Regional integration 
towards regional 
security) 
Pathway for military 
integration 
(Military integration towards 
interoperable defence forces) 
War between 
member states 
improbable 
Security community Interdependent defence 
institutions 
 Security regimes Complementary defence 
institutions 
 Regional conflict Jointness and co-operation 
amongst defence institutions 
 Chaos and national 
interests 
National security and warfighting 
War between 
member states 
probable 
  
(Source: Own compilation from Buzan, 1994 and Gagiano, 2002) 
 
 The above adjustment to the South African defence paradigm is perhaps still 
in line with the outlook held by the 1994 ascendancy of Defence in a Democracy 
and the central role it afforded the state.  It furthermore still follows a line 
characterised by eclipsing state security with human security and then introducing 
regional security as a further level of security to be pursued, but one calling for 
dramatic adjustments to the role of defence forces.  Irrespective how it is viewed, the 
state remains the central organising concept and custodian of military power and 
security provision.  Should the state, however, be denied this prominence, a severe 
challenge to the existing defence paradigm is bound to arise.  This continued 
prominence of the state and its possible demise is central to the rise of a crisis and 
the need for a further paradigm shift in how defence policy is to direct the SANDF. 
 Although Vale admits that continuity of the old (security and the state as a 
central tenet) remains influential to satisfy the need for security assurances, an 
alternative and much more critical view needs to be acknowledged.111  The 
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assumption that the quest for security can be pursued without the state playing its 
central role is bound to create a dilemma for defence forces.  Defence without the 
state and its primary policy instrument for coercion is to be questioned if secondary 
agents of security begin to eclipse the state as the provider of security.112 
 Looking towards the future, Vale posits that, if left to its natural dynamics, 
Southern Africa is bound to emerge as a stateless entity where imposed borders are 
destined to become meaningless.113  Issues of food, water, land and human security, 
not the state and coercive military power, now become the markers and providers of 
security for all.114  The degree to which the state persistently fails to deliver security 
(as it did according to Vale), another avenue of approaching security should be 
considered.115  States, political power, superiority, violent conquest and a role for 
defence forces as a means to provide security, therefore stand to be altered.116  
Family clan, tribe, business, trading, and religion are new forms for conducting 
societal affairs and are currently already accommodated within the state system of 
the Southern African region.  If issues of land, water, food and human security arise 
as the true focus and explanatory constructs of a security paradigm forged through 
family, clan, tribe, business, trading and religious interests, what paradigm for 
defence and the SANDF is then to accompany this radical and non-linear future? 
6. Conclusion 
 The question pursued in this paper was whether the transformation of the 
South African defence paradigm in 1994 debunked the Total Strategy of the SADF 
and in so doing paved the way for the SANDF and whether or not this could be 
explained by elements of the theory on scientific revolutions.  This question was 
pursued by making use of the following logic contained in the theory: 
 
- First, scientific revolutions hold that paradigm shifts arise when an 
established paradigm begins to falter in its ability to explain phenomena and 
developments within its assumed field of reference. 
- Secondly, this explanatory void causes an ensuing crisis that creates leeway 
for a competing paradigm to arise. 
- Third, adherents of the new normally introduce an alternative paradigm 
containing more explanatory value than its predecessor for the changing 
conditions. 
- Lastly, the contending paradigm subsequently competes with and ousts, or 
co-exists, with the older paradigm.  This process can assume evolutionary or 
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revolutionary parameters, but irrespective of this, a paradigm shift needs 
time and recurrent adjustments to establish itself and mature. 
 When applied to the rise of the SANDF and its guiding policies, it was 
established that the perspectives directing the SADF became questionable when they 
could no longer relate to and manage the demands of the fast-changing strategic 
environment and expanded defence outlooks required at that time.  The crisis arising 
from this inability and in particular to explain and accommodate post-Cold War 
shifts and changes in South African society, resulted in a empty space in South 
African defence thinking.  As a result, a crisis ensued and, as a prerequisite for the 
rise of rival paradigm, the crisis hastened the demise of the SADF and the migration 
to the SANDF.  An opposing paradigm founded upon Defence in a Democracy was 
introduced and its adherents managed to muster significant political support to have 
the opposing paradigm successfully compete with its predecessor. 
 The theory on scientific revolutions, however, holds that the introduction of 
a new paradigm is only the first step in a process.  The rival paradigm needs to 
mature over a period of time.  In this regard the 1998 Defence Review, the 2001 
Military Strategy, a debate on the roles of the SANDF according to the new 
paradigm, and even a second review of defence matters destined for the end of 2004, 
allowed the rival paradigm some time to mature, to absorb and respond to 
challenges.  Further minor adjustments such as shifting the paradigm and the 
SANDF closer to the African agenda of national government also materialised 
whilst little, if any opposition, from adherents to the earlier paradigm obstructed the 
rise of the new.  Along this pathway the new defence paradigm became more 
entrenched and some equilibrium between it, national demands and external 
developments began to show.  The paradigm shift, however, is more observable in 
how one policy framework competed with an outdated one and to a lesser extent in 
the roles and missions of the SANDF.  As for the latter, roles and missions of the 
South African armed forces were augmented and reprioritised to suit the new policy 
paradigm, rather than fundamentally altered. 
 Although dramatic paradigm shifts are rare, it does not imply they are 
improbable or always large and revolutionary.  Therefore, two further possibilities 
for shifting and even resetting the South African defence paradigm were briefly 
noted.  First, the possibility of extensive regional political integration calling for 
highly integrated and interoperable defence forces.  Second, and beyond the comfort 
of the state-paradigm, the challenge arising from a demise of the centrality of the 
state-security-defence triad and its replacement by communal entities below the 
state.  Both these alternatives are destined to challenge the current defence paradigm 
directing South African defence matters and the role of the SANDF – the former 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 32, Nr 1, 2004. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
 114
                                                          
much earlier than the latter.  It is furthermore possible that they could even obstruct 
its future maturation over time. 
 Some correlation exists between the theory on paradigm shifts and the 
unfolding of events that effected the migration from the Total Onslaught/Total 
Strategy defence paradigm of the SADF to that of Defence in a Democracy and the 
SANDF.  Not only can an initial dramatic and normative shift be observed and 
outlined, but also on-going smaller adjustments as embodied in the theory of Kuhn.  
It can be concluded that indicators identified in this paper on scientific revolutions 
contain a notable explanatory value towards understanding defence adjustments and 
the eventual establishment of the SANDF, as well as for explaining ongoing shifts in 
the South African military domain. 
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